The Legal Case for a Regional Bilateral Labour Agreement Model in East Africa

Africans, especially East Africans, are a highly mobile population. The continent has seen a surge in migration both within and outside the continent. The most common drivers of migration continue to be economic hardship within families across the continent, climate change, and political upheavals. In the East African region, migration to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states continues to be on the rise, with the most common countries of origin being Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Tanzania. This is attributed to the Gulf’s proximity to East Africa as well as its economic opportunities, making it an attractive destination for many young people, who constitute a vast proportion of the migrant workforce from origin countries, with women disproportionately affected due to the feminisation of labour.

This growing mobility demonstrates not only personal choice but a structural economic reality in which migration has increasingly become a livelihood strategy for families across East Africa. Scarce domestic employment opportunities, among other push and pull factors, have collectively transformed labour migration into a means of survival rather than a temporary livelihood option.

The GCC states, on the other hand, have a colossal demand for inexpensive foreign labour, with Saudi Arabia taking the lead, particularly in the context of long-term economic diversification, especially with concerns surrounding its depleting oil reserves. The sending states (countries of origin) benefit immensely from migration through diaspora remittances. In Uganda, for instance, diaspora remittances continue to be a dominant pillar of the economy, rising to approximately Ush 6.5 trillion, with Ugandans in the Gulf contributing 38% (Ush 2.24 trillion). In Kenya, 2026 reports indicate that Saudi Arabia is the third-largest source of diaspora remittances, with inflows totalling KSh 39.0 billion.

These numbers illustrate that labour migration is no longer a small or temporary phenomenon but is deeply embedded within the macroeconomic stability strategies of sending states. Diaspora remittances support countries’ social needs and foreign currency reserves. This economic reliance may help explain the political caution observed by sending states when renegotiating BLAs with destination countries.

Despite the pivotal role that migration plays in these countries’ economies, human rights concerns persist. Reports of mistreatment, abuse, and worker deaths continue to emerge. East African youth seeking Gulf employment generally begin their journeys with hope but often encounter exploitation and severe rights violations. Migrant workers, especially domestic workers, continue to face hardships such as low wages, physical abuse, sexual abuse, and other forms of exploitation. Protection mechanisms, on the other hand, remain insufficient.

The persistence of these violations reveals a protection gap within the current labour migration governance framework, where economic growth for states takes precedence over rights-based protections for workers. Even though migration has expanded significantly, accountability mechanisms, monitoring systems, and labour guarantees have not evolved at the same pace.

This gap is also reflected in the challenges surrounding the strengthening of labour protections. Feedback from relevant government ministries and state departments indicates that revising minimum standards requires navigating a delicate balance, with fears that stronger protections may shift demand for Kenyan labour to other East African countries.

This dynamic is what policy analysts often refer to as a “race to the bottom”, whereby sending states compete with one another by maintaining lower regulatory standards with the aim of remaining attractive suppliers of labour. Unilateral reforms in such environments become risky because stronger protections by one country may inadvertently disadvantage its workers in cross-border labour markets.

The underlying reality, however, remains that East African states wield significantly greater power when acting collectively. These states have enjoyed close historical, commercial, industrial, cultural, and social ties for many years and possess substantial untapped bargaining power when negotiating as a bloc. One of the major objectives of the Community, as articulated in Article 5(1) of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (EAC Treaty), is to develop policies and programmes aimed at widening and deepening cooperation among Partner States in political, economic, social, and cultural fields.

Moreover, Article 5(3)(b) goes further to emphasise that such cooperation should eventually improve the quality of life of the peoples of East Africa. An understanding of the two provisions, read together, underscores that labour migration governance is undoubtedly within the Treaty’s developmental mandate, especially where it directly affects economic welfare and human dignity.

Furthermore, Article 6(d) of the EAC Treaty outlines the fundamental principles of the Community, including good governance, adherence to the rule of law, and the protection and promotion of human and peoples’ rights as enshrined in the African Charter. Labour migration agreements that systematically expose citizens of Partner States to harm risk undermining these foundational principles. A regional BLA can therefore serve as an operational mechanism for advancing existing Treaty obligations and objectives, particularly in strengthening migrant worker protection. This can therefore give Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania an edge in negotiating better protections and favourable provisions for migrant workers in bilateral labour agreements.

This obligation is further underscored by Article 104 of the Treaty, which calls upon Partner States to cooperate in matters involving the free movement of persons, services, and labour, including the harmonisation of labour policies. Even though commonly interpreted within the context of intra-regional mobility, the provision can, by reason, be understood to extend to extra-regional labour mobility. A region that seeks to harmonise its labour standards internally cannot possibly export fragmented, weak, and unequal labour protections externally.

Moreover, Article 104(3)(d) and (e) mandate Partner States to maintain common employment policies and harmonise labour policies across the region. A standardised regional framework for negotiating bilateral labour agreements would not merely represent a novel political initiative but would also operationalise existing Treaty commitments.

The Community can therefore create a common EAC model or minimum negotiating framework that can be adapted for negotiations with individual GCC states. This approach removes the challenge of individual states failing to advocate for stronger protections due to fears that labour demand will shift to neighbouring countries.

A coordinated regional strategy would turn EAC Partner States from labour-export competitors into a collective negotiating bloc, strengthening their influence in interactions with destination countries in much the same way that coordinated economic alliances enhance bargaining power in international markets. Establishing minimum regional standards on wages, recruitment regulation, and worker protections could prevent downward competition while simultaneously safeguarding migrant workers’ rights.

In conclusion, the central question facing EAC Partner States is not whether migration will continue, but whether it will be governed collectively and safely. Regional unity presents an opportunity to reconcile economic dependence on migration with legal and moral obligations to protect citizens abroad, while also strengthening bargaining power to secure better working conditions, higher wages, and increased remittance flows. The EAC Treaty framework already provides the legal architecture required. What remains is the political goodwill to implement it.